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Abstract 
 Regardless of justification, it is commonplace throughout the U.S. criminal 
justice system as in everyday life to teach our offenders and children alike that 
wrong actions “have consequences,” namely, those authority figures promise to 
impose upon them. We do so in the name of holding people responsible for their 
actions, or in legal parlance in civil law, holding them accountable or liable. I 
noticed that in Norwegian, responsibility, accountability and liability translate 
into one word, ansvar, which I have translated from Germanic to Latin roots as 
“responsiveness.” In practice, the state of being responsive to others with whom 
one conflicts occurs when empathy moves one to recognize and accommodate 
the interests of others, in Roger Fisher’s terms, to shift focus from position to 
interests, a shift I observed as a victim-offender mediator. When we hold people 
responsible, we dictate rules to replace rather than invite and encourage 
assumption of responsibility for how ones’ actions affect others; we require 
obedience in place of building capacity for self-control. In legal terms, we 
adjudicate rather than mediate our differences. I turn from the paradox to 
identifying ways in which responsibility is also engendered rather than taken 
in our relations, inside and outside the criminal justice system, in our daily 
lives. I seek to recognize and encourage transition in our political culture from 
control by power over others to control by sharing power with others, in 
moments of conflict as in all our moments of cooperation. 
 
Giving or Taking Responsibility 
 If you are hiring someone, you may well ask of references: Is s/he 
responsible? Implicitly, can s/he be trusted if given the power to make 
decisions that affect others? That is what my parents wanted to trust in me, 
that I would prepare and go to bed responsibly if they left me with a babysitter. 
Or when they asked me to repeat after them when I was spending time with 
my first cousin, two years my junior, “I will be a responsible leader.” Implicitly, 
putting people in positions of responsibility implies trust that they will notice 
and be respond empathically, acknowledging both what works for others, and 
especially, acknowledging one’s harms and mistakes, adjusting one’s own 
agenda or course of action accordingly. People requite, foster or earn trust by 
learning how not to repeat their mistakes, including pain and fear they cause 
in others. This is a world in which people assume responsibility for the 
consequences of their own actions, including redress or remedy for 
consequences of their own actions. 
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Contrast this to the common-law notion of responsibility: Because I find 
you responsible for injury or damage you have done, I will GIVE you adverse 
consequences, to teach you a lesson and to make you suffer in retaliation for 
the suffering you have caused. You will pay a penalty, you will be punished. 
Now, do as I say because I say so. Instead of asking you to be moved by your 
feeling for those who suffer your harms, I demand your obedience to my 
commands, because I find you irresponsible. 
  
Bottom line: I can try to enable you to exercise responsibility—give you 
responsibility—or I can take it away and dictate your choices, orders to follow, 
lest I make you suffer further. Giving responsibility offers actors a chance to 
respond empathically to those one’s actions affect; responsibility is taken when 
obedience to power is commanded (Pepinsky 1998). If you want people to be 
responsible, you have to give them room to exercise it. 
  
My quest has been to understand how to invite and welcome 
assumption of responsibility, especially in matters of crime/violence—of harm 
one causes others. Globally among groups and nations, it is a foundation for 
“peace” or “trust-building,” “reconciliation,” “conflict resolution.” In and around 
criminal justice, acknowledgment of responsibility for one’s actions is a 
fundamental requirement for “restorative justice.” Richard Quinney and I 
(Pepinsky and Quinney 1990) have examined work by criminologists who do 
and study the process that includes victim-offender reconciliation 
“peacemaking” (Pepinsky and Quinney 1991; Pepinsky 2013). Peacemaking 
takes hold as we somehow acknowledge and try to help clean up messes we 
have made, with one another as in our ecosystem. 
 
Responsibility, Accountability, and Liability 
 I often find it informative to translate ideas and concepts from one language 
to another. The mediator’s practice of “reframing” what someone says is a form 
of translation, ostensibly within a single language. When I returned to Norway 
in 1986 on a Fulbright to spend time especially with Nils Christie and to study 
Norway as a relatively “peaceful society,” I prepared a colloquium presenting 
the idea of the class bias in applying the law to those who have harmed others: 
Criminal prosecution concentrates on holding underclass people “responsible”; 
civil litigation holds predominantly higher-class people “liable”; people who 
betray trust from positions of power over others are held “accountable.” In 
Norwegian, responsibility, liability and accountability translate into one word, 
“ansvar.” In its Germanic roots, ansvar means “answer toward,” which in Latin 
translates more clearly in English as “responsiveness,” that is, shifting one’s 
idea of what’s at issue to accommodate the meaning or concern underlying 
others’ conflicting issues (Pepinsky 1988), manifestation of empathy. Action 
driven by empathy is responsive, also known as being or becoming responsible, 
assuming responsibility, for the consequences of one’s actions for others. We 
know “responsibility” in many terms, in many ways, as attitudes or motives we 
impute to what we do. Among practitioners and theorists of restorative justice, 
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bringing offenders’ attitude of shame out into the open is a vital part of 
offenders’ assumption of responsibility for harm they have done. 
 
Apology as Acceptance of Responsibility 
 It is often a requirement of formal victim-offender mediation that offenders 
apologize for the harms they have done. Writing as an experienced Mennonite 
facilitator of victim-offender mediation between Canadian prisoners who have 
committed serious violent offenses including rape-murder, and victims or their 
loved ones, Gustafson (2017) recognizes offenders’ apologies as a condition 
necessary to making meaningful amends to their victims which at least 
partially relieve their fears, pain and suffering: acknowledgment of harm done, 
displayed in affect as well as in words, making oneself emotionally vulnerable. 
Whatever words offenders use, these are the elements which when combined 
signify “apology” to victims. 
 
Releasing Shame or Shaming 
The most powerful way to shame anyone is by means of violence, just as the 
most powerful way to provoke anyone into committing violence is by shaming 
him. Our language itself tells us this.—Gilligan (1993) 
 
James Gilligan wrote this from his experience as a psychiatrist treating 
those confined as violently, “criminally” insane. Meanwhile, the version of 
“restorative justice” known as “conferencing,” with police officers functioning 
as well-scripted facilitators, was first introduced in Australia, based on 
Braithwaite’s (1989) theory, inferred from Japanese mediation practices, that 
transformation of offenders’ behavior entailed their being shamed by their 
victims’ pain and loss. This process is illustrated by an award-winning 
documentary, “Facing the Demons” (Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
1999) of a conference in prison between two men who participated in a robbery 
of a Pizza Hut in Canberra in which an employee was shotgunned to death; one 
accompanied by his mother, the other by a chaplain; the since-divorced parents 
of the victim; and the victim’s co-workers and close friends. The video is 
available together with ensuing interviews with participants. In the reception 
after the conference, the father of the victim recruits one of the offenders to join 
the work of the non-profit he has formed to oppose gun violence. In the follow-
up interview, he reports feeling “lighter” after unburdening himself of the pain 
he felt for what he had done. The mother of the victim now remembers him as 
he lived rather than being haunted by identifying his body in the morgue, and 
generally, as the victim’s girlfriend reports, emerge “happier.” Healing appears 
to happen for all concerned. 
 
If the conference in “Facing the Demons” represents Braithwaite’s 
shaming process in action, I find it equally plausible to infer that the process 
enabled the offenders to release the sense of shame they brought into the 
conversation. There is no indication that the facilitator has done any shaming 
himself, let alone asked victims to do anything other than to tell the offenders 
what they have suffered and how else it makes them feel—anger, questions and 
all; in litigators’ terms, he leads none of the witnesses. The crucial point is that 
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insofar as shame emerges, it is elicited simply by hearing the fear, pain and 
anger—the harm—straight from those you have hurt, and having the chance 
to respond, to offer to make amends, to respond to need, to assume 
responsibility. It is for social phenomenologist Alfred Schütz (1970) a matter 
of “apperception,” attribution of motives we feel or impute to others for our 
actions and theirs, which Schütz divides into “because” and “in-order-to” 
motives—what makes us do or say what we do, and what we are after. As a 
matter of social control, I see this as the distinction between our understanding 
of forces that restrain us, and how we pursue honest self-interest, self-
expression, accomplishment…again a case in which we have many words for a 
similar attitude. I owe it to my mother, Pauline Pepinsky’s (1970) insight, to 
have laid out what became to me as I entered law school the underlying model 
for distinguishing whether responsibility is assumed or one is being held 
responsible, whether shame is released or imposed, and more broadly, to 
distinguish the attitudes toward social control I have called “warmaking” and 
“peacemaking.” 
Loci of Impulse Expression and Impulse Control 
 From social science to fiction to everyday life as reported in the news and as 
she otherwise encountered it as among newly made friends, my mother (P. 
Pepinsky, 1970) inferred that the prevailing political formal and informal 
culture of social control in the United States and in Norway differed in one key 
respect: In the United States, people typically saw control coming from outside, 
implicitly, from the top down; while “impulse expression,” creativity, 
achievement and failure thereof, was seen to be in the individual, which she (a 
social psychologist by training) called “Mode A” of social interaction, or as I 
came to see it, as a paradigm for trying to achieve social control. In Norway, 
“Mode B,” by contrast, achievement and failure were gauged by what the group 
achieved together (as in reducing economic inequality), and controlled by 
people containing themselves from “sticking out,” whether by hurting others 
or by displaying wealth, who thrived on cooperation, as in substantial 
representation of labor required on corporate boards, and from my later point 
of view, dropped to one of the world’s lowest incarceration rates by the end of 
the 19th century, where it very nearly remains. The locus of impulse expression 
is the group; the locus of impulse control rests predominantly in the individual. 
 
There are many stories about coming home from a foreign culture and 
seeing one’s homeland in a new light. I began to see many instances of “Mode 
B” ways people had, especially in the supposedly politically conservative 
Midwest, in which I grew up and to which I returned for most of my 
teaching/learning career. Consider for instance the idea of training for and 
promoting “teamwork” in U.S. daily life, from competitive sports to private 
enterprises and formal organizations of all sorts. Ideally, you listen and learn 
as freely as you participate in creating a group product or idea, measuring 
success and failure by what the group accomplishes together, acknowledging 
self-discipline in contributing rather than inhibiting the collective enterprise. 
Ideally, each member becomes responsible for controlling his or her actions, 
over which impulses to restrain (anger? distrust? retaliation? competition?), 
and which to offer as one’s own contribution to the common good one 
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expresses, in words and in other action—which impulses to express to 
accommodate and contribute to the needs and interests of others. 
Perhaps Howard Zinn (2015) is best known for pointing out, in the 
United States, the usual descriptions of political culture we receive are from a 
literate elite, while if we pay attention, “the people” who have inhabited this 
country have shown considerable variation, as among the aboriginal 
inhabitants of what became the Massachusetts colony, or on the island that 
became Hispaniola. From (trans-)national to our personal relations in daily life, 
the “modes” of social control we adopt vary considerably, if only we notice. 
Mode A and Mode B represent the attitudes toward one another we adopt in 
moments of difference including conflict, whether we assume responsibility for 
hearing, expressing and addressing consequences of one another’s behavior we 
have given and received; or seek to have responsibility imposed or taken by an 
outside, superior authority, as by law enforcement and prosecution or parental 
discipline. 
 
As in writing social history, we tend to overlook routine ways we 
resolve differences in our daily relations, as in conflicts and wanting to do 
different things with close and trusted friends, companions and confidants. For 
many of us, we respond so habitually with those we trust that we become 
scarcely aware, whether or not we find it easy to say “I’m sorry,” that when we 
notice our friend’s hurt or anger, we are motivated to change course and do 
something to help make it better, to go through steps of acknowledgment of 
responsibility and shift course toward trying to repair any hurt or offense, 
rather than persisting or ignoring the harm done. It is when our conflicts are 
with strangers, or with those we fear and don’t trust, that the elements of the 
process of transforming our relations from conflictual to cooperative become 
severable as stages of acknowledgment of personal responsibility and 
accountability for harm done, to assumption of responsibility for doing 
something to relieve the psychic, physical or material damage on one side, and 
letting go of the fear and pain one has suffered, a “forgiveness” that transforms 
one’s status from victimhood to survivorship, an expression of impulse or 
release from inside oneself rather than feeling imposed from outside. In this 
paradigm of eliciting rather than imposing responsibility, victims’ forgiveness 
(and potentially, collateral victimization suffered by those labeled offenders 
too) implies that they throw off something of the control fear and anger has 
held over their ensuing lives, while offenders are relieved of being controlled 
by shame. 
 
If the process results in resolution of conflict, it is because all parties’ 
social reality has shifted from one of being controlled by circumstance to 
having agency in their relations—to having self-control and the opportunity 
to be appreciated and accepted by others for one’s social belonging as one 
emerges from the process. For the group in these circumstances, the locus of 
control has shifted to each individual, the measure of accomplishment the sense 
of safety, security and trust they have achieved together. It is the challenge of 
those of us who seek to facilitate this transformation of our conflicts to identify 
and create the social conditions under which parties to conflict feel safe enough 
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to share the pain and loss, and to assume responsibility for one’s actions and 
feelings and their consequences to others, and gain recognition of consequences 
one has suffered, to the point at which what has led them to the present turns 
focus to discussion of where we go next. 
 
Balancing the Yin and Yang of Social Control 
 In the West, Lady Justice holds a scale, a balance. Likewise, the basic 
Chinese character for “peace,” is a balance, with a people on each side, tilted at 
the top to symbolize that dynamically, the balance always tilts between human 
forces one way and another. And in classical Chinese cosmology, those social 
forces are known as yin—the womanhood, the moon, the silver, creative, 
receptive, tacitly cohesive force, and yang—the manhood, the sun, the golden, 
dominant, both constructive and destructive force. Justice and peace entail 
balancing our dependence on participating in an established social order; and 
accommodating and embracing individual and social change—a balance 
between accommodating diversity and depending on conformity to social 
expectations, between adapting to chaos and imposing order: in Pauline 
Pepinsky’s (1970) terms between modes of action in which we control ourselves 
to produce results for a common good, or simply live by the rules of feeding, 
sheltering, of who’s in charge, and of performing what legal or customary 
duties are laid down for us. In everyday life from personal to organizational 
levels, we co-exist in a balance between living within imposed order, and 
accommodating and embracing change. 
  
Consider the process of successful victim-offender mediation Gustafson 
(2017) describes. Participants enter the dialogue speaking for themselves 
alone—describing what they have done and what has happened to them, 
controlled only by rules upheld by the mediator. When the process works, the 
focus shifts toward mutual acceptance of responsibility for creating a way 
forward, where the tangible product is an agreement the parties have created 
together, where parties have become self-controlled in the process of creating 
a joint product. 
  
In turn, terms of agreement are themselves accommodations to 
established social and material order. What can offenders reasonably be 
expected to do to make amends? Practically speaking, what result can victims 
reasonably expect offenders to accomplish, and how can they help it happen 
rather than standing in the way or having unreasonable expectations, that 
really makes a difference to you? A settlement becomes a synthesis of change 
and acceptance of what over time can become a shifting societal balance, as 
reflected for instance in sustained decarceration. Occasions for restorative 
justice arise when conflict, or social disorder or entropy, becomes heated within 
the parameters of established order, and ideally, cools or synergizes the conflict 
or chaos into cooperation. As between victims and offenders, it transforms pain, 
fear, anger, guilt and shame and distrust into trust and mutual liberation…for 
the moment at least—where irresponsibility and its consequences are replaced 
by assumption of responsibility by all concerned going forward. It is just that 
in the political culture of the United States where the dialogue of control by 
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power over others prevails in public discourse, the ways we resolve conflict by 
mutual accommodation in our institutions as in everyday life remain yin, 
unnoticed, unconscious, so that when conflict becomes overt, we tend to resort 
to the yang of assigning blame and holding those blameworthy responsible for 
their actions, subjugating them to the will of others by negative and positive 
reinforcement, by punishment and extrinsic reward. We all live some balance 
of both. In a political culture where the yang of holding people responsible by 
reward and punishment (as by incarceration) prevails in public discourse and 
action, denial of personal responsibility for one’s actions becomes the 
overriding generator of social conflict and disorder. The challenge of 
transforming the damage we do each other out of selfish interest and disregard 
for those harmed is to set conditions which enable people to acknowledge freely 
harm they have done and suffered to one another, and to assume responsibility 
for coming to terms which leave everyone involved feeling safer and more 
secure—to move from competing to mutual interests. Identifying and creating 
processes which enable people to become responsible/liable/accountable for 
deciding and doing what it takes to relieve the pain, loss, fear, and distrust at 
hand—to become mutually empathic, responsive to one’s another’s needs and 
interests. In Norwegian Nils Christie’s (1981) terms, it is a matter of giving 
parties ownership of their disputes, disrupted by modernized police failure to 
know those they police in many respects. Today it remains manifested in 
Norway where mediation mechanisms and boards are available for every level 
conflict and dispute in the private and public sphere, from personal to the 
corporate levels. For international conflicts, the process of process why which 
conflicting groups undertake joint responsibility for coming to terms is 
described by Fisher et al. (1992) as Getting to Yes. It is a process of balancing 
accommodation to structure as it is, and creative, adaptive response to 
emergent social need and circumstance, for the sake of social safety and 
security, built on trust, embracing diversity, and assuming ownership of, 
responsibility for, conflict management. Holding people responsible for 
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